Commentary on R
v. Gladue
Jonathan Rudin, LL.B., LL.M.
Program Director
Aboriginal Legal Services of
Toronto
416.408.3967 ext. 226
alst@web.ca
On
April 23, 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada (referred to as “the Court”
throughout this note) released its decision in R v. Gladue - a decision
that could have far-reaching implications for the way in which Aboriginal
offenders are sentenced by the courts.
At the same time, the decision presents real challenges for defence
counsel and Aboriginal justice service providers in terms of the work that they
must do in order to make the decision meaningful for their clients. The case raises many issues, both
theoretical and practical. In this
brief note, I will concentrate on the some of the significant aspects of the
decision as they relate specifically to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.[1]
Background
The
decision deals with the interpretation of s. 718.2 (e) of the Criminal Code of
Canada. The section, which was part of
a comprehensive series of amendments made in 1996 to the sentencing law in
Canada, states:
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also
take into consideration the following principles:
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment
that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all
offenders, with particular attention to
the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.
The
Court states that the 1996 amendments represent a change in the way judges
should approach the sentencing process (para. 33). The first part of s. 718.2 (e) directs judges to look at
alternatives to jail for all offenders.
In doing so, the judge will look at the circumstances of the particular
offender before the court as well as the circumstances surrounding the offence
with which the person is charged. The
Court notes that Canada sentences more people to jail per capita than all but one or two other countries in the Western
world. In making this observation, the
Court is clearly indicating its concern with this trend (para 52).
The Court’s Findings
Regarding Aboriginal People and the Criminal Justice System
With
respect to the over-incarceration of Aboriginal people, the Court states:
If overreliance upon incarceration is a problem with
the general population, it is of much greater concern in the sentencing of
aboriginal Canadians. (para. 58)
The
Court then goes to on to restate its finding in R v. Williams that the
discrimination faced by Aboriginal people in Canada extends to the legal realm:
[t]here is evidence that this widespread racism has
translated into systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system. (para.
61).
The
Court goes further than it did in Williams, however, by endorsing
conclusions reached by the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba and the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. In
particular, the Court accepts the first conclusion of the Royal Commission’s
report on criminal law - “Bridging the Cultural Divide” that:
The Canadian criminal justice system has failed the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada ‑‑ First Nations, Inuit and Métis
people, on‑reserve and off‑reserve, urban and rural ‑‑
in all territorial and governmental jurisdictions. The principal reason for this crushing failure is the
fundamentally different world views of Aboriginal and non‑Aboriginal
people with respect to such elemental issues as the substantive content of
justice and the process of achieving justice. (para. 62)
The
Court also makes this very significant finding with regard to Aboriginal people
and the prison system:
... as has been emphasized repeatedly in studies and
commission reports, aboriginal offenders are, as a result of these unique
systemic and background factors, more adversely affected by incarceration and
less likely to be “rehabilitated” thereby, because the internment milieu is
often culturally inappropriate and regrettably discrimination towards them is
so often rampant in penal institutions. (para. 68)
After
reviewing many of the studies on Aboriginal over-incarceration, the Court
reaches the following important conclusion:
These findings cry out for recognition of the
magnitude and gravity of the problem, and for responses to alleviate it. The figures are stark and reflect what may
fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system. The drastic overrepresentation of aboriginal
peoples within both the Canadian prison population and the criminal justice
system reveals a sad and pressing social problem. It is reasonable to assume that Parliament, in singling out
aboriginal offenders for distinct sentencing treatment in s. 718.2(e), intended to attempt to redress this
social problem to some degree. The
provision may properly be seen as Parliament’s direction to members of the
judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem and to endeavour to remedy
it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing process.
(para 64)
What Is the Meaning of S.
718.2 (e)
Given
these findings, what distinguishes the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders
from the circumstances of all other offenders and what impact do these
distinctions have in the sentencing process?
The
Court identifies two unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders:
1)
the systemic factors which often play a part in bringing the specific offender
before the courts; and
2)
the types of sentencing approaches that might be appropriate to the offender
because of his or her Aboriginal heritage (para. 66).
While
the Court notes that many offenders have suffered difficult social
circumstances, in the case of Aboriginal offenders these circumstances are
often the result of direct and overt discrimination towards Aboriginal people
in general. Given the experience of
such discrimination, the Court concludes that a judge should be less likely to
assume that incarceration - itself the source of discrimination towards
Aboriginal people - would be able to assist Aboriginal offenders in changing
their criminal behaviour, and that in fact, incarceration might result in
greater hardship to Aboriginal offenders than to non-Aboriginal offenders (para
68).
As
a practical matter, the Court does not require each Aboriginal offender to
provide the sentencing judge with a history of the discrimination faced by
Aboriginal people in Canada. Rather,
the Court states that judges must take judicial notice of these factors (para
83). The term “judicial notice” means
that judges can rely upon the findings of other commissions and the Supreme
Court, as well as their own knowledge of the general history of Aboriginal
peoples with regard to the way in which they have been treated in Canada. The Court makes it clear, however, that
judicial notice in this case does not allow the judge to reach any conclusion with
regard to the treatment of Aboriginal people, rather the judge must recognize
that overt discriminatory acts were not only directed at Aboriginal people in
the past, but that discrimination, both systemic and direct, continues to exist
in Canada today.
It
is important to note that the Court states that the provisions of s. 718.2. (e)
apply to all Aboriginal offenders. It
does not matter if the person is a status or non-status Indian, Metis or Inuit
person - the section applies equally to all (para 90). Similarly, it does not matter if the person
lives in an urban area and/or has been totally estranged from his or her
culture - the section still must be applied (para 91). The provisions of the section must be
applied in all cases where the offender identifies him or herself as an
Aboriginal person and provides some evidence as to how their Aboriginal
identity has had a part to play in understanding why they are before the
court. I would suggest that the very
fact of estrangement from the Aboriginal community is in and of itself
sufficient to allow the sentencing judge to immediately embark upon a s. 718.2
(e) inquiry.
The
second circumstance that the Court addresses relates to sentencing practices
and processes particularly relevant to Aboriginal offenders. The Court broadly terms these approaches
“restorative justice” approaches. It
describes restorative justice as:
an approach to remedying crime in which it is
understood that all things are interrelated and that crime disrupts the harmony
which existed prior to its occurrence, or at least which it is felt should
exist. The appropriateness of a
particular sanction is largely determined by the needs of the victims, and the
community, as well as the offender. The
focus is on the human beings closely affected by the crime. (para 71).
The
Court makes it clear that a sentence that is intended to address restorative
justice concerns should not be seen as necessarily ‘lighter’ than a sentence of
imprisonment. The Court also cites
articles that suggest that in some circumstances, a restorative justice
sentence might impose greater burdens on an offender than jail, particularly if
there are probation terms incorporated into the sentence (para. 72).
Talk
of restorative justice approaches to sentencing usually suggests activities
such as sentencing circles or specific community run alternative justice
programs. The Court is careful to point
out that while these types of initiatives certainly fall within the restorative
justice concept, sentences can be crafted by a judge alone that meet these
goals as well.
The
importance of this point is that there are few alternative justice programs
actually functioning in Canada - particularly in urban areas - and sentencing
circles have not become common fixtures in the courtrooms of Canada. If the application of s. 718.2 (e) was
restricted to only those types of initiatives, then the promise of the section
would ring hollow for the vast majority of Aboriginal offenders. Keeping this fact in mind, the Court
provides a broader view of how restorative justice concepts could be
accommodated in sentencing:
Sentencing judges should not conclude that the
absence of alternatives specific to an aboriginal community eliminates their
ability to impose a sanction that takes into account principles of restorative
justice and the needs of the parties involved.
Rather, the point is that one of the unique circumstances of aboriginal
offenders is that community‑based sanctions coincide with the aboriginal
concept of sentencing and the needs of aboriginal people and communities. It is often the case that neither aboriginal
offenders nor their communities are well served by incarcerating offenders,
particularly for less serious or non-violent offences. Where these sanctions are reasonable in the
circumstances, they should be implemented.
In all instances, it is appropriate to attempt to craft the sentencing
process and the sanctions imposed in accordance with the aboriginal
perspective. (para 74)
In
this sense, a community-based sanction is one that addresses the needs of the
offender, and perhaps the victim and broader community as well. It does not require formalized acceptance by
the local Aboriginal community however it is defined - it might not even
involve the Aboriginal community at all.
For example, a sentence might require attendance at a treatment program
or participation in counselling. These
programs might be delivered by Aboriginal agencies and in general it would be
preferable if they were; however, this should not be a requirement for a s.
718.2 (e) sentence. Since the
provisions of the section apply to all Aboriginal offenders, it would not be
right to deny an offender access to the section because there is no Aboriginal
community of any size where he or she is being sentenced or because the
Aboriginal community does not possess the services the offender needs.
The
Court makes it clear that the fact that an offender is an Aboriginal person
will not automatically result in a non-prison sentence. The Court also indicates that the more
violent the offence, the more likely that the sentence will involve
imprisonment, although the Court indicates that perhaps the term of
imprisonment might be less in the case of an Aboriginal offender as opposed to
a non-Aboriginal offender (para. 79).
The Challenges in Making the
Section Work in Practice
The
Court suggests that in order to craft a 718.2 (e) sentence a judge should
expect to receive assistance from defence counsel and from a pre-sentence
report (para 93 - point 7). At the same
time, however, the Court makes it clear that even unrepresented Aboriginal
offenders are entitled to rely upon s. 718.2 (e). A number of practical questions arise:
How will relevant
information come before the court where the offender is unrepresented?
In the case of
represented accused persons, what is to be done if defence counsel do not do
the job they should in terms of making submissions on sentencing to the
court?
What if defence
counsel, even if they wish to make appropriate submissions, do not know how to
go about finding out the resources available in the community for the
particular offender?
These
types of situations are likely to occur.
Indeed, they might well be the norm.
The Court assumes that pre-sentence reports will play a very significant
role in these types of sentencings. For
the pre-sentence report to have an impact however, the person preparing the
report must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of Aboriginal people to
obtain the necessary background information from the offender and his or her
family, and also sufficient knowledge of
community resources - particularly Aboriginal-specific resources - to make
intelligent suggestions to the judge.
While there may well be some people employed by provincial probation services capable of performing
this role, it should not be assumed that they are present in every
jurisdiction. The systemic and direct
discrimination faced by Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system does
not magically stop at the probation office.
Where
will judges, particularly in the absence of diligent defence counsel, find the
resources necessary to allow them to embark upon a realistic s. 718.2 (e)
inquiry? It is likely that increased reliance will be placed upon Aboriginal
Courtworkers and Aboriginal alternative justice program personnel - where such
programs are in place. These
individuals will likely find themselves providing advice and submissions to the
court, either through defence counsel or directly to the court, and also
preparing pre-sentence reports, either instead of established sources or in addition
to other reports. This raises a serious
question as to whether the resources currently exist for such endeavours to be
undertaken by Courtworkers and justice program personnel. If people and programs are already taxed to
the limit, how will the additional work be provided? As well, the question must be asked if current program staff have
the training and expertise to provide the information and advice that they will
likely be called on for? And what of jurisdictions with Aboriginal offenders
but no Aboriginal justice resources?
Conclusion
Gladue provides an opportunity to
take some meaningful steps to counter the increasing reliance on incarceration
as the response of choice of the courts to the sentencing of Aboriginal
offenders. In order to make the promise
real however, sentencing judges must be presented with realistic assessments of
offenders and of non-jail community options.
This need provides a challenge to the Aboriginal Courtworker program and
to Aboriginal alternative justice programs.
If these programs are not to be found wanting, serious consideration
must be given to both training and resource needs. It would be unrealistic to expect that the same number of people
currently delivering services can suddenly deliver significantly increased and
enhanced services at a moment’s notice.
The opportunity is here now to start to make real changes to what the
Court describes as a “crisis” in the criminal justice system in Canada. These changes however will require a
concerted effort from a variety of sources to ensure that the promise of change
is not lost.
[1] The paragraph numbers used here refer to the numbered paragraphs in the Court’s decision in R v. Gladue. The word “Aboriginal” is capitalized whenever it is used unless I am directly quoting a source that does not capitalize the word.